A class of non-cooperative stochastic games with major and minor agents is investigated where agents interact with a completely observed common process. However, the common process is modulated by a latent Markov chain and a latent Wiener process (common noise) which are not observable to agents. Consequently the Wonham filter is used to generate the posteriori estimates of the latent processes based on the realized trajectories of the common process. Then, the convex analysis is further developed to (i) solve the mean field game limit of the problem, (ii) demonstrate that the best response strategies generate an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the finite player game, and (iii) obtain explicit characterisations of the best response strategies.
Introduction
In this paper, an MFG framework is considered where there exist one major agent and a large number of minor agents which are subject to linear dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Each agent interacts with other agents in the system through the coupling in their cost functional with a common process. The common process is modulated by a latent Markov chain process and a latent Wiener process, which are not directly observed by the agents but rather are inferred from the agents' observation processes. We refer to the latent Wiener process as the common noise process. Moreover, the common process is impacted by the major agent's state, the major agent's control action, the average state of all the minor agents, and the average control action of all the minor agents. We obtain the best response strategies for the major agent and each individual minor agent in the infinite population limit which collectively yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the finite population system.
Motivation: Financial and economic systems (among others) are often driven by latent factors, and these latent factors also affect the cost (profit) functional of the traders involved. Moreover, the agents in these system are often acting in a non-cooperative manner, and hence playing a large stochastic game with one another; while they may control aspects of the system, they are also at the whim of factors they cannot control or observe. For example, in optimal execution problems (where traders aim to sell or buy shares of an asset), all traders are subject to the same asset price process and must make their trading decisions based on the observed price. The asset price dynamics may be driven by a common Wiener process, which accounts for so-called noise (uninformed) traders. In addition, the effect of unobserved factors on the price dynamics, other than the major agent's trading action and the aggregate impact of minor agents' trading actions, are important factors to incorporate (see e.g. [1] , [2] ) in specifying the best response trading strategies and ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Methodology: Although latent processes are not directly observable, the information provided from the realized trajectories of the common process and the evolution of system's aggregate state (mean field) can be used to obtain posteriori estimates, and to subsequently partially predict future behavior of the common process [1] . Certain versions of such problems can then be recast as MFG systems with a common noise. A variation of this type of MFG system has been investigated in [3] , where the case of correlated randomness in a nonlinear setting is analyzed. Here we utilize a different approach in order to address the existence of a latent process together with the common noise. Specifically, we treat the common process as a major agent and further extend the Major -Minor LQG MFG analysis of [4] to incorporate such a latent process in the dynamics. Then, we utilize the convex analysis approach in [5] to obtain the best response strategies for all agents that yield an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces a class of major minor MFG problems with a common process as well as a latent process. The MFG formulation of the problem is then presented in Section 4. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Major Minor Mean Field Game Systems with a
Common Process
Dynamics: Finite Population
We consider a large population of N minor agents and a major agent, where the agents are coupled through their individual cost functionals with a common process.
Major and Minor agents
The underlying dynamics of the major and minor agents are assumed to be given, respectively, by
where t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ N, N = {1, . . . , N}, N < ∞, and the subscript k ∈ K, K = {1, . . . , K}, K ≤ N, denotes the type of a minor agent. Here,
. . , N}, are the states, u i t ∈ R m , i ∈ N 0 are the control inputs, {w i t , i ∈ N 0 } denotes (N + 1) independent standard Wiener processes in R r , where w i is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration F w := (F w t ) t∈[0,T ] . All matrices in (1) and (2) are constant and of appropriate dimension; the vector processes b 0 (t), and b k (t) are deterministic functions of time.
Assumption 1. The initial states {x i 0 , i ∈ N 0 } are identically distributed and mutually independent and also independent of
Minor Agents Types:
Minor agents are given in K distinct types with 1 ≤ K < ∞. The notation
with Θ being the parameter set, and Ψ may be any dynamical parameter in (2) or weight matrix in the cost functional (6) . The symbol I k denotes
where the cardinality of I k is denoted by N k = |I k |. Then, π N = (π N 1 , ..., π N K ), π N k = N k N , k ∈ K, denotes the empirical distribution of the parameters (θ 1 , ..., θ N ) sampled independently of the initial conditions and Wiener processes of the agents A i , i ∈ N. The first assumption is as follows.
Assumption 2.
There exists π such that lim N →∞ π N = π a.s.
Common Process: Finite Population
We consider the systems where the major agent and any minor agent A i , i ∈ N, observe a common stochastic process y t , where both the state and common process y t appear in an agent's cost functional as introduced in Section 3.2. The common process y t ∈ R n is governed by
where y L t evolves as in
In (4), the process Γ := (Γ t ) t∈[0,T ] denotes a latent continuous Markov chain process with Γ t ∈ {γ j , j ∈ M}, M = {1, . . . , M}, M < ∞; the vector f (t, y L t , Γ t ) denotes a deterministic nonlinear function of t, y L , and Γ; w t ∈ R r denotes a latent Wiener process independent of {w i t , i ∈ N 0 }, and the matrices F , F 0 , H, H 0 , and σ are deterministic, constant and of appropriate dimensions. Moreover, by substituting (4) in (3), it is evident that the common process y t is impacted by 1) a latent Markov chain process Γ t , 2) the major agent's state x 0 t ,
3) the major agent's control action u 0 t , 4) the average state of minor agents, i.e. x
5) the average control action of minor agents, i.e. u
6) a latent Wiener (common noise) process w t ∈ R r independent of w 0 t , w i t , i ∈ N. Assumption 3. The major agent A 0 completely observes its own state and the common process y t . Assumption 4. Each minor agent A i , i ∈ N completely observes its own state, the major agent's state and the common process y t .
We again emphasize that the latent processes Γ t and w t are not directly observed by the agents A i , i ∈ N 0 . However, each agent may obtain their posteriori estimates based on its complete observations on the common process y t . We refer to the latent Wiener process as the common noise process in this work.
Control σ-Fields
We denote by
T ] the natural filtration generated by the major agent's state (x 0 t ) t∈[0,T ] , and F := (F t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by the states of all agents ((
. Moreover, we denote by G := (G t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by (Γ t , w t ) t∈[0,T ] , and F y := (F y t ) t∈[0,T ] the natural filtration generated by (y t ) t∈[0,T ] . Next, we introduce two admissible control sets. Let U 0 denote the set of feedback control laws with second moment lying in L 1 [0, T ], for any finite T , which are adapted to the smaller filtration F 0,r := (F 0,r t ) t∈[0,T ] , where F 0,r := F 0 ∨ F y . The set of control inputs U i , i ∈ N, based upon the local information set of the minor agent A i , i ∈ N, consists of the feedback control laws adapted to the smaller filtration F i,r :
T ] constraint on second moments applies in each case. We note in passing the significant differences between the information structures specified here and those in the team theory literature [6] .
Assumption 5 (Major Agent's Linear Control Laws). For major agent A 0 , the set of control laws U 0,L ∈ U 0 , is defined to be the collection of linear feedback control laws adapted to F 0,r .
Assumption 6 (Minor Agent's Linear Control Laws). For each minor agent
is defined to be the collection of linear feedback control laws adapted to F i,r , i ∈ N.
Cost Functionals: Finite Population
Given the vector z 0 t as
the major agent's cost functional to be minimized is formulated by
where
Assumption 7. For the cost functional (5) to be convex, we assume that
Similarly, given the vector z i t , i ∈ N, as
the cost functional to be minimized for minor agent A i , i ∈ N, is formulated by
Assumption 8. For the cost functional (6) to be convex, we assume that G k ≥ 0,
Major Minor LQG Mean Field Games Approach
In the mean field game methodology with a major agent [7] , [4] , the problem is first solved in the infinite population case where the average terms in the finite population dynamics and cost functional of each agent are replaced with their infinite population limit, i.e. the mean field. For this purpose, the major agent's state is extended with the mean field, while the minor agent's state is extended with the major agent's state, and the mean field; this yields stochastic optimal control problems for each agent linked only through the major agent's state and mean field. Finally the infinite population best response strategies are applied to the finite population system which yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
To address major minor mean field game systems involving a common process and a latent Markov chain process, the following steps are followed. We first note that the common process in this work represents an extended form of common noise in [3] . However, a different approach is followed to incorporate the common process in the major minor LQG mean field game framework. First in Section 4.1, the evolution of the state mean field and the control mean field in the infinite population case are derived. Then, an F 0,r -adapted and F i,r -adapted, i ∈ N, forms of the common process in the infinite population case are presented in Section 4.2. Next in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, the common process is perceived as a major agent in the major minor LQG MFG framework. Subsequently, the major minor LQG analysis described above is further extended where the major agent's state is extended with the mean field and the F 0,r -adapted common process, while a minor agent's state is extended with the major agent's state, the mean field, and the F i,r -adapted common process. Finally, a convex analysis method is performed in Section 4.5 to obtain the best response strategies which yield the infinite population Nash equilibrium and finite population ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Mean Field Evolution
The common process y t governed by (3) is involved with the empirical average of the minor agents' states, i.e. x 
Control Mean Field
The empirical average of minor agents' control actions is introduced as
and the vector u
] is defined, where the pointwise in time L 2 limit of u (N ) t , if it exists, is called the control mean field of the system and is denoted byū t = [ū 1 t , ...,ū K t ]. We consider for each minor agent A i , i ∈ N, of type k, k ∈ K, a uniform (with respect to i) state feedback control u i,k t ∈ U i,L as in
where t ∈ [0, T ], L k 1 , L k,l 2 , L k 3 and L k 4 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions, and m k t is a F y t -measurable process. If we take the average of the control actions u i,k t over the population of the agents of type k, k ∈ K, and hence calculate u (N ) t , it can be shown that the L 2 limitū t of u (N ) t as N → ∞, i.e. the control mean field is given bȳ
wherex t , if it exists, denotes the state mean field introduced in Section 4.1.2,ȳ t denotes the limiting process associated with the common process y t as N → ∞ (see Section 4.2), andr t is a F y t -measurable process. Furthermore, the matrices in (9), i.e.
are to be solved for using the mean field consistency equations (47)-(48) derived in Section 4.5.
State Mean Field
Similarly, the empirical state average is introduced as
and the vector x
] is defined, where the pointwise in time L 2 limit of x (N ) t , if it exists, is called the state mean field of the system and is denoted byx t = [x 1 t , ...,x K t ].
If we substitute (8) in (2) for i ∈ N, and take the average of the states of the minor agents' closed loop systems of type k, k ∈ K, and hence calculate x (N ) t , it can be shown that the L 2 limitx t of x (N ) t , i.e. the state mean field, satisfies
whereȳ t denotes the infinite population limit of the common process y t (see Section 4.2),m t is a F y t -measurable process, and the matrices
are again to be solved for using the mean field consistency conditions (47)-(48) derived in Section 4.5.
By abuse of language, the mean value of the system's Gaussian mean field given by the state processx t = [x 1 t , ...,x K t ] shall also be termed the system's mean field (The derivation of the state mean field equation above may be performed using the methods of [8] , [9] and [4] ).
Common Process: Infinite Population
Each agent completely observes the common process y t but has no observations on the latent Markov chain process Γ t . In order to resolve the issue of the unobserved latent process Γ t , Wonham filtering method is used to estimate the distribution of Γ t based on the observations of each agent on y t , i.e. F y t . Subsequently, f (t, y L t , Γ t ) and w t in (4) are presented in their F y t -adapted forms (see e.g. [1] , [10] ).
Denote the transition probabilities for the continuous time Markov chain process Γ by
and the corresponding transition rates by v ij ≥ 0, and
The posterior distribution of Γ t conditional on F y t is denoted by
with initial distribution {π j 0 , j ∈ M}. Remark 1. As a result of Assumptions 3-4, the major agent A 0 , and each minor agent A i , i ∈ N, completely observe the unaffected common process y L t given by (3) . Consequently
Lemma 1 (Wonham Filter). [10] If σ > 0, the posterior distribution Π of Γ t is given by
where f = ( f t , t ∈ [0, T ]) is an F y t -adapted process defined as
and is computed by
Then the process w t is an F y t -adapted Wiener process.
According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, equation (4) can be rewritten as
and by substituting (22) in (3), the F 0,r t -adapted dynamics of the common process for the infinite population case, i.e.ȳ t , is given by
where the average terms x (N ) t and u (N ) t in (3) have been replaced with their L 2 limit as N → ∞, i.e. the state mean fieldx t and the control mean fieldū t , respectively. Moreover, F π = π ⊗F and H π = π ⊗H, where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of the corresponding matrices.
Remark 2. Since the state and the control action of each individual minor agent A i , i ∈ N, do not affect the infinite population evolution of the common process, i.e.ȳ t , the F i,r t -adapted and F 0,r t -adapted dynamics of the common processȳ t in the infinite population limit are identical and given by (23).
Major Agent's Regulation Problem : Infinite Population
First, the major agent's state x 0 t is extended with the state mean fieldx t and the infinite population common processȳ t to form the major agent's extended state
By substituting (9) into (23), the matrices in the extended major agent's dynamics (24) are given by
Next, the major agent's extended cost functional is given as
where the corresponding weight matrices are given by
The minimization of the extended cost functional (26) subject to the extended dynamics (24) constitutes a stochastic optimal control problem for the major agent in the infinite population limit. Then, according to Theorem 3 the major agent's optimal control action is given by
where Π 0 (t) and s 0 t are to be solved for usinġ
and the FBSDE
The Riccati eqution (31) and the offset equation (32) shall be derived in Section 4.5.
Finally, the closed-loop dynamics of the major agent A 0 when the control action (30) is substituted in (1) is given by
Minor Agent's Regulation Problem: Infinite Population
First, minor agent A i 's, i ∈ N, state is extended with the infinite population common processȳ t , the major agent's state x 0 t , and the state mean fieldx t to form the minor agent's extended state
To attain the extended matrices in (34), the joint dynamics of (i) minor agent A i 's system given by (2), (ii) the common processȳ t given by (23) where (9) and (30) are substituted , (iii) the major agent A 0 's closed loop system given by (33), and (iv) the state mean fieldx t given by (12) are utilized which results in
Next, the minor agent A i 's extended cost functional is formed as
The dynamics (34) together with the cost functional (36) constitute a stochastic optimal control problem for minor agent A i , i ∈ N, in the infinite population limit. Then, according to Theorem 3, the minor agent A i 's optimal control action for the infinite population case is given by
where Π k (t), k ∈ K, is the solutions to the following deterministic Riccati equatioṅ
and s i,k t , k ∈ K, is the solution to the following FBSDE
The complete derivation of (39)-(40) will be discussed in Section 4.5.
Finally, control action (68) is substituted in (2) which gives minor agent A i 's, i ∈ N, closed loop system as
Remark 3. We note that for the case where there exists no latent process, i.e. y L t = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], the diffusion terms of (32) and (40) become zero and they reduce to the deterministic offset equations of classical major minor LQG mean field games in [4] .
Nash and ǫ-Nash Equilibria
To derive the mean field consistency equations which specify the matrices in the control and state mean field equations, respectively, (9) and (12), the closed loop system (41) of minor agent A i is rewritten as
Then the block matrices 
are defined, where Π k,11 , Π k,22 , Π k,33 ∈ R n×n , Π k,44 ∈ R nK×nK ; N k,1 , N k,2 , N k,3 ∈ R n×m , N k,4 ∈ R nK×m ; and e k ∈ R n×nK , k ∈ K, denotes a matrix which has the identity matrix I n in its kth block and zero matrix 0 n×n in other (K − 1) blocks. Now, if the average of (42) over N k minor agents of type k, k ∈ K, and then its L 2 limit as the number N k of agents within the subpopulation k goes to infinity (i.e. N k → ∞) be taken, it yields
In (44),s k t is obtained by taking the average and then the L 2 limit of (40) over the subpopulation k ∈ K as N k → ∞, and is given by
and henceq t is an F 0,r t -adapted process. Then, equating (44) with (12) results in the following sets of equations.
Equations (47)-(48) are called the mean field consistency equations (see [4] ) from which the matrices in (9) and (12) can be calculated. Now, according to the asymptotic equilibrium analysis performed in [4] , the following matrices are defined. The analysis above leads to the following theorem where convex analysis and asymptotic MFG equilibrium analysis are utilized to establish the infinite population Nash equilibrium and finite population ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Proof. We use the convex analysis method developed in [5] to obtain the best response strategies (17)-(19) and (23)-(25); this proves parts (i) and (ii) of the theorem. Then following the asymptotic equilibrium analysis of [10] , the set of infinite population control actions yields an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the large population system which proves part (iii) of the theorem. First, the convex analysis is performed for the major agent A 0 's extended system to derive the major agent's optimal control action in the infinite population limit. Using Theorem 2 in [5] , the Gâteaux derivative of the major agent's
